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Despite many studies on selective attention, fundamental questions remain about its nature and neural
mechanisms. Here I draw from the animal andmachine learning fields that describe attention as amechanism
for active learning and uncertainty reduction and explore the implications of this view for understanding
visual attention and eye movement control. I propose that a closer integration of these different views has
the potential greatly to expand our understanding of oculomotor control and our ability to use this system
as a window into high level but poorly understood cognitive functions, including the capacity for curiosity
and exploration and for inferring internal models of the external world.Introduction
LongagodefinedbyWilliamJamesas ‘‘the focusingof themind,’’
selective attention is simultaneously one of our most pervasive
and most baffling cognitive functions. On one hand attention
is recruited for nearly every behavior and has been investigated
in humans, monkeys, mice, and rats. On the other hand despite
this wealth of research, significant questions remain about
the nature of attention, its purpose and neural mechanisms.
In humans and nonhuman primates, much of our knowledge of
the mechanisms of attention comes from the system of vision
and eye movement control. Intensive research into this system
has shown that attention affects sensory representations at all
levels of the visual hierarchy, starting from low-level areas such
as the lateral geniculate nucleus, through high-level cortical
areas in the inferior temporal lobe (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009; Saalmann and Kastner, 2011). These studies also suggest
that the source of attentional modulations lies, at least in part,
in sensorimotor areas associated with rapid eye movements
(saccades). Two areas that have been particularly well investi-
gated are the lateral intraparietal area and the frontal eye field
(shown in Figure 1A for the macaque monkey brain). Neurons
in these areas have spatial receptive fields and saccade-related
responses and respond selectively to stimuli that are likely to
attract attention in a variety of tasks. Not specifically sensory
or motor, these cells seem to encode the specific act of target
selection, and can provide feedback regarding this selection
both to earlier visual areas and to downstream movement struc-
tures that generate shifts of gaze.
Important questions remain however, about the significance
and computations underlying this target selection response.
Historically, two frameworks have been used to explain this
response. One line of research describes target selection in
motor decision terms, as the integration of evidence toward,
and eventual commitment to a shift of gaze (Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009). An alternative interpretation
describes it as stimulus selection—the act of focusing on a
sensory cue that may drive attentional modulations of the
sensory response (Bisley and Goldberg, 2010; Gottlieb and
Balan, 2010). While earlier studies have attempted to dissectthe visual versus the motor components of target selection,
more recent studies have emphasized the decision—free
choice—aspect of the saccadic response.However, thedecision
framework has remained largely separate from an attentional
interpretation and it is unclear to what extent the two frameworks
are compatible or distinct (Maunsell and Treue, 2006).
In this perspective, I propose a broader approach that inte-
grates elements of both explanations and considers the cogni-
tive aspects of eye movement control. Consistent with the
decision framework, I propose that the neural response to target
selection can be viewed as an internal decision that seeks to
maximize a utility function (i.e., increase a benefit and minimize
a cost). However, consistent with an attention interpretation I
emphasize that, as a system controlling a sensory organ—the
eye—this decision must be optimized for sampling information.
Therefore, the distinction between visual and motor selection,
which may seem trivial in sensorimotor terms, becomes highly
significant in a decision perspective. To understand oculomotor
decisions we must tackle the complex and little understood
question of how the brain ascribes value to sources of informa-
tion, and how this may differ from value determined by primary
reward.
The question of active information selection is rarely studied as
a distinct topic (and even more rarely in individual cells), but
it arises repeatedly in learning and memory research. Recent
evidence from computational and behavioral studies makes it
clear that processes of information selection tap into some of
our highest cognitive functions, involving, among others, intrinsic
curiosity and the ability for advance planning and forming
internal models of complex tasks (e.g., Gershman and Niv,
2010; Johnson et al., 2012). My goal in this perspective is to
consider these processes and their relevance to vision and eye
movement control. I begin with a brief overview of target selec-
tion responses in monkey frontal and parietal cortex and their
relation with attention and eyemovement control. I then consider
the possible relation between target selection and informa-
tion selection, drawing particularly on three areas that have
been traditionally separate from oculomotor research—namely,
studies on associative learning in humans and rats (HollandNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 281
Figure 1. Current Approach to Attention
Research
(A) Cortical areas investigated in relation to atten-
tion. Lateral view of the macaque monkey cortex
showing some of the areas that have been
investigated in relation with attention, including
primary visual cortex (V1), area V4, the middle
temporal area (MT), and two sensorimotor areas,
the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) and the frontal
eye field (FEF).
(B) Normalization model of attention. The model
includes two populations of cells: feature selective
neurons that are sensitive to stimulus location
and features (e.g., orientation) and respond to a
stimulus with both excitatory and suppressive
drives (black panels, lower row) and attention
neurons that are selective only for location and
provide a selective multiplicative gain (gray, top
row). Reproduced with permission from Reynolds
and Heeger (2009).
(C) Reward sensitive target selection activity in
a decision task. Monkeys were trained to direct
gaze to one of two possible targets for receipt of
a juice reward, and the targets were placed so as to fall inside or opposite the receptive field of an intraparietal cell (dashed oval). Traces show the average
responses of a cell population, aligned on the time of target presentation and the monkeys’ subsequent choice. The neurons encoded the direction of the chosen
saccade, responding more for saccades directed toward versus away from the receptive field (blue versus green). Directional selectivity however became
stronger as a function of the difference in expected reward (dotted, thin solid, and thick solid traces show progressively larger differences in expected reward).
Reproduced with permission from Sugrue et al. (2004).
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2010),, studies of eye movement control in natural behaviors
(Hayhoe and Ballard, 2005; Tatler et al., 2011), and computa-
tional studies in the machine learning field (Dayan and Daw,
2008; Dayan et al., 2000; Oudeyer et al., 2007).
Because of the complexity and vastness of the topic, my
discussion will be necessarily incomplete. I will eschew circuit-
level mechanisms (most of which are currently unknown), and
detailed mathematical considerations (for which excellent
descriptions can be found elsewhere [Dayan and Daw, 2008;
Dayan et al., 2000; Oudeyer et al., 2007]). Despite these limita-
tions however, I hope that it will become clear in the forthcoming
discussion that appreciating the cognitive dimensions of eye
movement control is both a necessity and a source of strength.
Gaining this appreciation is necessary for explaining a range of
observations regarding the neural responses to target selection,
which have no good explanation in sensory or motor terms.More
importantly perhaps, broadening our perspective will strengthen
the field of oculomotor research and allow us to use the full
power of this system as a window into high-level but poorly
understood cognitive functions.
From Vision to Eye Movements, and an Intermediate
Stage
Research on selective attention in humans and nonhuman
primates spans numerous studies, using a vast array of psycho-
physical and neurophysiological techniques. While these studies
differ widely in their specific details, many share the common
feature that they direct subjects to attend to a specific item—
be it an object, feature, or location—and measure the effects
of attentional selection on perception or action. These studies
have shown that attention produces widespread effects
throughout early and late visual areas, which collectively in-
crease the signal from the attended item and suppress noise
from unattended distractors (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). A
shift of attention can remain covert—generating only an im-282 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.provement in perceptual discrimination—or can be accompa-
nied by saccades—rapid eye movements that place the fovea
on the attended item. The oculomotor component of an atten-
tional response is generated by a network of cortical and subcor-
tical structures that includes portions of the basal ganglia, the
superior colliculus, and the frontal eye field (Schall et al., 2011;
Stanford et al., 2010).
Neurophysiological studies have also shown that, interposed
between visual processing and saccade production is an in-
termediate layer of target selection, which has been most
intensively investigated in the frontal eye field and the lateral
intraparietal area (Figure 1A). A large fraction of neurons in these
areas have spatial receptive fields and respond both to visual
stimuli and/or to a planned saccade. Rather than being selective
for a visual features, these cells encode a more abstract quantity
of target selection—i.e., discriminate between targets and dis-
tractors in a variety of tasks (Gottlieb and Balan, 2010; Thomp-
son and Bichot, 2005). Experiments that manipulate the salience
or relevance of visual cues show that target selection cells
respond very selectively to stimuli that are likely to be attended,
either because of their physical salience or behavioral relevance
(Gottlieb et al., 1998; Thompson and Bichot, 2005). Experiments
that dissociate visual selection from motor output show that
neural responses to target selection can be flexibly linked with
action—for example, being coupled with a shift of gaze, with
a skeletal response or with no immediate motor action (Balan
et al., 2008; Bisley and Goldberg, 2003; Schall et al., 2011).
Experiments involving direct manipulations (i.e., through micro-
stimulation or reversible inactivation) show that these two areas
produce both feedforward effects—specifying potential plans
for a saccadic response—and feedback influences—driving
the perceptual effects of attention that are expressed either in
visual neural responses (Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Noudoost
and Moore, 2011) or in psychophysical reports (Balan and Got-
tlieb, 2009; Wardak et al., 2006; Wardak et al., 2004).
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Having thoroughly characterized the target selection response,
these studies set the stage for tackling the next critical question:
how does the brain generate this selective response, and how do
parietal and frontal cells ‘‘know’’ where to attend (Baluch and Itti,
2011)? Surprisingly, despite thewealth of attention research, few
studies have addressed this question. To appreciate this gap, let
us consider three classes of computational models that synthe-
size empirical findings on various aspects of selective attention.
One substantial body of investigation has examined the sen-
sorimotor transformation for eye movement control—the chain
of events through which visual selection generates an eyemove-
ment response. Recent models synthesizing these findings have
proposed a process of gated accumulation, whereby the accu-
mulation of information in saccade movement cells is insulated
from visual selection unless (or until) an eye movement becomes
appropriate (Lo andWang, 2006; Purcell et al., 2012; Schall et al.,
2011). Themodel captures a host of findings related to visual and
motor selection and the brain’s ability flexibly to link attention
with action. However, the model does not attempt to explain
target selection itself; it simply asks how visual selection, once
it has been generated, gives rise to an overt saccade.
A similar stance is adopted by models focusing on sensory
responses, which ask how parietal or frontal signals of target
selection may produce sensory attentional effects. A recent
‘‘normalization’’ model of attention has been particularly suc-
cessful in explaining a large number of sensory effects using
a simple biologically-plausible circuit (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009). As illustrated in Figure 1B, the model proposes that
a spatially selective ‘‘attention field’’ is fed back to the visual
system and multiplicatively scales visual inputs in spatially
specific fashion. Followed by divisive normalization based on
local competition with other visual inputs (‘‘suppressive drive’’),
this attentional influence results in a biased visual representation
where the attended stimulus ismore strongly represented (‘‘pop-
ulation response’’). The ‘‘attention field’’ conforms to the proper-
ties of the target selection response—i.e., it is sensitive to spatial
location but not visual features. However, this drive is portrayed
as a box with an output but no inputs; in other words, the model
focuses on its sensory effects, but not on how the drive is itself
generated.
And finally, a similar stance is adopted by models describing
the links between attention and decision formation. A common
theme in these models is that attention influences the accumula-
tion of evidence toward the attended option, making the subject
more likely to select that option (Krajbich et al., 2010). These
models begin by assuming that attention exists, but do not
explain how it may come to be—e.g., why subjects may attend
to a specific object in the first place.
These computational efforts therefore, reflecting the state of
the art in empirical research, uniformly treat attention as an
external bias term. They portray attention as a ‘‘cognitive force’’
that has widespread influences on perception and action but
which is itself external to, rather than emergent from, these latter
functions.
Target Selection as a Value Representation
A notable exception to this theoretical stance comes from an
unexpected source—a line of studies that have not addressedattention per se but have used the eye movement system as
an experimental platform for studying decision formation. These
studies start from the premise that the ultimate goal of any act of
selection is to maximize an organism’s biological fitness. There-
fore it seems likely that, as specific types of selection, eye move-
ments and attention would also satisfy a utility function—i.e.,
seek to maximize a benefit and minimize a cost. Guided by this
idea, decision studies have trained monkeys to choose between
eye movement targets that deliver various amounts of juice
reward. By placing the targets inside and opposite the receptive
field of a target selective cell, these studies evoke the target
selection response and study its properties to gain insight into
decision formation.
A consistent outcome revealed by these investigations (which
have been typically carried out in the lateral intraparietal area) is
that the signal of target selection is not stereotyped but
increases as a function of the relative desirability of the alterna-
tive options (Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Sugrue et al., 2005).
An example of this result is shown in Figure 1C in a task where
monkeys had to choose between two alternative targets whose
payoffs varied dynamically from trial to trial (Sugrue et al., 2004).
Monkeys apportioned their choices in proportion to the recent
history of reward, and neurons in the lateral intraparietal area
increased their selective responses in proportion with the
target’s expected reward: firing for a saccade directed toward
the receptive field increased monotonically (blue traces, dashed
to solid), while firing for a saccade to a different location
decreased monotonically as a function of reward expectation
(green traces). Similar results are obtained in tasks that manipu-
late the desirability of a target using different methods, for
example by controlling the relative magnitude, probability or
delay of its expected reward (Bernacchia et al., 2011; Louie
et al., 2011; Sugrue et al., 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Taken
together these studies suggest the powerful hypothesis that
target selection neurons encode the relative value of alternative
actions, and that they integrate multiple sources of evidence
pertinent to this estimation.
This utility-based view of target selection is particularly attrac-
tive not only because of its parsimony and elegance, but also
because it has straightforward theoretical interpretations in
economic and reinforcement learning terms. The computational
framework of reinforcement learning, originally developed in the
machine learning field (Sutton and Barto, 1998), has been partic-
ularly successful in explaining behavioral and neuronal results.
The core idea in this framework is that agents (be they animals
or machines) constantly estimate the values of alternative
options based on their repeated experience with these options.
This intuition is captured in the Rescorla-Wagner equation,
which states that the estimated value at time t (Vt) is based on
the estimate at the previous step (Vt-1) plus a small learning
term (b)d):
Vt =Vt1 + b  d (Equation 1)
As described above, parietal neurons encoding target selec-
tion are thought to report an action value representation—the
term V in the Rescorla-Wagner equation—and to update this
representation in dynamic fashion (Sugrue et al., 2004). ThisNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 283
Figure 2. Attention as Information Selection
(A) Gaze behavior in naturalistic tasks where a
subject fills a kettle for preparing tea (top) or
prepares a peanut butter sandwich (bottom). Gaze
is directed to task relevant locations that reduce
the subject’s uncertainty, and precede the skeletal
actions. Reproduced with permission from Land
(2009).
(B) Three putative attentional mechanisms that
assign associability according to the reliability
(left), uncertainty (middle), or reward probability
(right) predicted by a cue.
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anisms such as those in the basal ganglia or the superior collicu-
lus, to select optimal (reward maximizing) actions.
The right-hand—learning—term in the equation in turn has
been more closely linked with modulatory systems, in particular
noradrenaline and dopamine, and is composed of two quanti-
ties. One quantity, b, is a learning rate that takes values between
0 and 1 and determines how quickly the agent updates its
predictions. This rate may depend on global task properties
such as the volatility or uncertainty of a given task and could
be conveyed through neuromodulation (Cohen et al., 2007; Nas-
sar et al., 2012).
The second quantity is the prediction error term (d), which
describes how ‘‘surprised’’ the agent is by a particular out-
come—i.e., how well or poorly it had predicted that outcome.
This quantity, defined as the difference between the agent’s esti-
mate and the actual outcome at the previous step (d = r-Vt1),
provides a trigger for learning—updating expectations so as to
reduce future errors in prediction. A by-now classic series of
results suggests that the reward prediction error is encoded by
midbrain dopamine cells (Glimcher, 2011; Schultz, 2006; Waelti
et al., 2001). An example of this prediction error response is
shown in Figure 3B, in an experiment in which monkeys were
initially uncertain about the size of a reward and at the time
marked ‘‘Cue’’ received a visual signal that conveyed information
about the expected reward (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka,
2009). Dopamine cells had a transient excitatory response to
a stimulus that signaled a larger-than-expected reward (‘‘Info-
big’’) and a transient inhibition to a stimulus that signaled
a lower-than-expected reward (‘‘Info-small’’) but had nearly
no response to a stimulus that provided no new information
(‘‘Rand,’’ blue traces). When the actual reward was delivered
(‘‘Reward’’) the cells again had excitatory and inhibitory re-
sponses to, respectively, high or low reward, but only if these284 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.reward were unexpected (‘‘Rand,’’ but
not ‘‘Info’’ conditions) precisely as ex-
pected from a prediction error term. As
shown by the Rescorla-Wagner equation,
such a signal of unexpected outcomes
can drive an agent to increase or
decrease its value estimates if the
outcome it has experienced was, respec-
tively, higher or lower than expected.
Taken together, these findings reveal
a remarkable confluence between com-putational and empirical results. They suggest an integrated
account of learning and decision formation, whereby value
representations are maintained in cortical and sensorimotor
structures and are dynamically updated based on feedback
from dopaminergic cells (Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Sugrue
et al., 2005).
Eye Movements Select Information
Casting target selection as an internal value estimation would
seem to bridge the conceptual gap in attention research. A
straightforward implication of this idea is that, to decide where
to shift gaze or where to attend, the brain may simply keep track
of the values of the alternative options and make choices ac-
cording to this value representation. A key challenge in making
this link however, concerns the specific value that has been
considered in the decision field. As I described in the preceding
section, in all current studies of decision formation ‘‘value’’ is
defined in terms of primary reward: the value of a saccade target
in a laboratory task is defined by the juice that the monkey
obtains by making the saccade (Figure 1C). In natural behavior
however, eye movements rarely harvest primary reward. In-
stead, they sample information.
Consider for example the eye movements made by a subject
in two everyday tasks—preparing a peanut butter sandwich or
filling up a kettle to prepare some tea (Figure 2A). Like the
monkey in a decision experiment, these subjects seek a
reward—i.e., a sandwich or a cup of tea. Unlike the monkey,
however, their rewards will not be realized by merely looking at
a spot, no matter how intense their attention may be. Rather,
the subjects use attention and gaze as intermediate steps that
allow them to acquire information, which will only indirectly guide
their future actions.
Computational studies of naturalistic behaviors show that the
act of acquiring information—whether it is overt or remains
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increases the chance of success of a future action (Tatler
et al., 2011). However, these studies also show that the
processes required to compute information value differ markedly
from those that have been so far considered in decision tasks. A
salient property of this process is that information value depends
critically on the subjects’ uncertainty and, in the Rescorla-Wag-
ner equation is more closely related with the right side of the
equation—the act of learning or modifying expectations. As
a simple illustration of this distinction, consider again the tea-
making task in Figure 2B. To prepare and consume her tea,
the subject must make both arm and leg actions, and in the rein-
forcement equation both actions would be assigned a high value
term (V). The subject’s gaze, however, is very selectively allo-
cated to the targets of the arm and not the leg actions. This
selectivity cannot be explained in terms of action value alone
but reflects the fact that the arm movements have higher uncer-
tainty and thus more to gain from new information. Thus, the
drive that motivates a shift of gaze is not value per se but the
need to learn—i.e., to update one’s predictions through new
information.
Independent support for a view of attention as a learning
mechanism comes from an area of research that has been
mostly separate from the oculomotor field (but see Le Pelley,
2010) but has directly addressed the cognitive aspects of infor-
mation selection—namely, the question of how subjects learn
from and about sensory cues (Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010).
A central finding emerging from these studies is that subjects
estimate the reliability of a sensory stimulus based on their prior
experience with that stimulus and use this knowledge to modu-
late their future learning based on that cue. In the Rescorla-Wag-
ner equation this process is implemented using an associability
parameter, a, which is a stimulus-specific learning rate (Pearce
and Mackintosh, 2010):
Vt =Vt1 +a  b  d (Equation 2)
While, as we have seen above, the standard learning rate b is
applied globally to a context or task, associability is a property of
an individual cue and can differentially weight the available cues.
As I discuss in detail in the following sections, this apparently
simple modification entails a complex, hierarchical learning
mechanism. It entails an executive process which, having previ-
ously learned the predictive validity of a sensory cue, guides the
moment by moment information selection—i.e., has in effect
learnt how to learn.
A final line of evidence for the information-bound nature of eye
movement control comes from single-neuron studies of target
selection that dissociate shifts of attention from overt shifts of
gaze (Gottlieb and Balan, 2010). An example of such a study is
the experiment shown in Figure 4A, in which we trainedmonkeys
to report the orientation of a peripheral target (a right- or left-
facing letter ‘‘E’’) by releasing a bar (Oristaglio et al., 2006).
Monkeys had to perform the task while maintaining their gaze
straight ahead (on the central fixation point), so that overt
saccades had no value and would have been punished with
a loss of reward—and indeed, monkeys actively suppressed
the saccades. Nevertheless the informative cue had value, andneurons in the lateral intraparietal area continued selecting the
cue, showingmuch higher activity if the ‘‘E’’ rather than a distrac-
tor was in their receptive field (Balan and Gottlieb, 2009; Balan
et al., 2008; Oristaglio et al., 2006; Figure 4B). These neural
responses are in some respect not surprising because the
capacity for covert attention has been well-established in
psychophysical research, and its correlates are found also in
the frontal eye field (Schall et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2005).
However the findings are highly significant from a decision
perspective: they highlight the fact that the decision variable
for target selection hinges not on the value of a motor action,
but on the properties of a sensory cue.
In sum, three lines of investigation conducted in very different
fields—studies of eye movement control in natural behaviors,
associative learning in humans and rats and target selection in
the frontal and parietal lobes—converge on a common point.
All these studies indicate that to understand oculomotor deci-
sions we must describe how the brain assigns value to sources
of information. What might this process entail?
Three Types of Attention
Ausefulway of organizing thediscussion starts from theproposal
advanced in the associative learning field that the brain has
several types of attention mechanism. These systems are
thought to have different neuronal substrates and to serve
different behavioral roles and are dubbed, respectively ‘‘attention
for action,’’ ‘‘attention for learning,’’ and ‘‘attention for liking.’’
To gain an intuitive understanding of these types of attention,
consider a hypothetical experiment in which you have a 50%
prior probability of receiving a reward, and on each trial are
shown a sensory cue that provides information about the trial’s
reward (Figure 2B). Some cues bring perfect information, indi-
cating that you will definitely receive or not receive a reward
(100%or 0% likelihood). Other cuesmake uncertain predictions,
e.g., that you have a 50% chance of reward. This set of sensory
cues can be characterized along two dimensions. One is the
expected reward of the cue, which is defined as the product of
reward magnitude and probability, and increases monotonically
along the x axis. The second dimension is the variance or reli-
ability the cue’s predictions. Variance is an inverted V-shaped
function with a peak for the 50% cue (Figure 2B, center). The
inverse of variance (reliability) has an upright-V profile, with
a minimum at the 50% cue and maxima for 0% or 100% predic-
tors (Figure 2B, left).
The associability hypothesis postulates that the systems of
‘‘attention for action’’ and ‘‘attention for learning’’ assign weight
based, respectively, on the reliability and variance of a cue’s
predictions (Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010). As shown in the
left panel of Figure 2B, the system of ‘‘attention for action’’ is
thought to assign low weight (associability) to cues that predict
an uncertain reward, but a high weight for cues that make
consistent predictions. This system would enable an animal to
attend to a familiar cue that makes consistent predictions,
such as a traffic light at an intersection. The system of ‘‘attention
for learning’’ on the other hand (Figure 2B, center) has the oppo-
site weighting and assigns priority to an uncertain or variable cue
(Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010). This system would enable an
animal to attend to novel and uncertain stimuli such as a newNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 285
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value-neutral in the sense that they do not depend on expected
reward: they give equal weight to stimuli predicting low or high
reward, provided these make equally reliable predictions.
The third system of ‘‘attention for liking’’ differs qualitatively
from the first two because it assigns priority simply in proportion
to the associated reward, directing more resources to a ‘‘good
news’’ (100%) relative to a ‘‘bad news’’ (0%) cue (Figure 2B,
right). Although not originally proposed in associative learning
research, converging behavioral and neural observations bring
strong evidence supporting this system (Hogarth et al., 2010;
Vuilleumier, 2005).
In the following sections I discuss each system in turn, consid-
ering questions related to their implementation and contrast-
ing the associability-based explanation with related proposals
from the reinforcement learning field.
Attention for Action: Reliability, Relevance, and Reward
Although not typically discussed in relation with eye movement
control, the system of ‘‘attention for action’’ that is proposed in
studies of associative learning maps naturally on the purposive,
task-related eyemovementsmade by subjects in everyday tasks
(e.g., Figure 2A). Quantitative studies show that practically all the
eyemovementsmade in naturalistic goal-directed behaviors can
be interpreted as acquiring information to guide a forthcoming
action (Tatler et al., 2011). According to the associability idea,
to achieve this type of control, the brain will explicitly learn
(and potentially represent) the reliability of the predictions gener-
ated by a cue (Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010). An alternative
explanation, however, emerges from studies of eye movements
in natural behaviors, which suggest that the value of an eye
movement lies in reducing uncertainty and increasing the ex-
pected reward (probability of success) of a future action (Ballard
and Hayhoe, 2009; Hayhoe et al., 2012; Rothkopf et al., 2007;
Tatler et al., 2011). I consider the relationship between these
ideas and their possible neural implementation.
Reliability
While support for the reliability hypothesis comes from behav-
ioral and neuropsychological studies in humans and rats
(Holland and Maddux, 2010; Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010),
a key open question at the present time is whether (and how)
reliability is encoded in individual cells. Perhaps the strongest
neural evidence supporting this idea comes from studies of
sensory perception, which show that the strength (signal to
noise) of a sensory input can mediate a reliability-based form
of sensory integration. For example, in tasks where monkeys
are trained to estimate their heading direction based on a combi-
nation of vestibular and visual motion cues, the relative influence
of the visual cue increases in proportion with the signal to noise
of its motion signal. A number of studies have proposed ways in
which stimulus strength, reflected in the width and strength of
its sensory responses, can mediate optimal reliability-based
cue integration (Fetsch et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2008; Vilares and
Kording, 2011).
It is unclear, however, whether the brain encodes the more
cognitive type of reliability that is postulated by the associative
learning field, which is not embedded in the stimulus itself but
requires learning of complex relationships between the stimulus286 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.and the predicted events. This is the type of reliability that we
may ascribe, for example, to a weather forecast, to the advice
we receive from our physician or to an economic indicator. While
a recent study using an ‘‘information choice task’’ proposed that
this type of reliability is encoded in midbrain dopaminergic cells
(Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009), the findings remain
open to alternative interpretations.
In the ‘‘information choice task’’ used byBromberg-Martin and
Hikosaka, monkeys began each trial with a 50% probability of
obtaining a largeor a small rewardandweregiven theopportunity
to obtain advance information about the size of the reward. As
shown in Figure 3A, if the monkeys shifted gaze to one of the
available targets (dubbed the ‘‘informative’’ target), this target
gave way to one of the cues that reliably predicted whether the
trialwill yield a large rewardor in a small reward (‘‘Info’’). However,
if monkeys shifted gaze to the unreliable target (‘‘Rand’’ in
Figure 3A), this target produced a distinct set of subsequent
cues that conveyed only uncertain (50%) information about the
future reward. Notably, the reward outcomes themselves were
on average equal and fixed in all conditions, so that monkeys
could not increase their physical reward with a specific choice.
Nevertheless, monkeys reliably selected the informative target
suggesting that they had an intrinsic preference for information.
Dopamine neurons (Figure 3B) had two types of responses
on the task. At the time of the actual information (marked
‘‘Cue’’) in Figure 3B, the neurons emitted the customary predic-
tion error response which, as described above, was excitatory
for a ‘‘good news’’ (big reward) cue and inhibitory for a ‘‘bad
news’’ (small reward) cue. Of particular interest however was
a response that preceded the actual cue and seemed to signal
the expected information. This response arose at the time of
the monkeys’ selection (marked ‘‘Target’’ in Figure 3B) and
was slightly stronger if the trial included an informative rather
than an uninformative cue (red versus blue traces). This early
response seems to signal a superordinate property of ‘‘informa-
tiveness’’ (or reliability) that is independent of a specific mes-
sage, and to correspond to the monkeys’ behavioral preference
for the informative cue.
Unfortunately however, because the information in this task
was about a primary reward, the results do not conclusively
rule out alternative explanations based on this reward. It is well
known that monkeys modulate their anticipatory licking based
on stimulus-reward associations and will stop licking when
observing a low-reward cue (Fiorillo et al., 2003). In addition as
I mentioned above, subjects direct attention based on stim-
ulus-reward associations, and may have gazed for longer
periods at the high-reward versus the low-reward cue (e.g., the
green cross versus green wave in Figure 3A; Hogarth et al.,
2010). It remains therefore possible that by selecting the informa-
tive cue the monkeys did not specifically seek information but
simply sought to minimize their effort (by avoiding having to
lick for or look at a low-reward pattern) or perhaps to bring about
the motivationally salient, high-reward pattern (Beierholm and
Dayan, 2010). At this time therefore it remains an open question
whether the brain has a bona fide reliability representation.
Internal Models, Uncertainty, and Information
Rather than searching for an ‘‘intrinsic’’ preference for informa-
tion, studies of eye movements in natural behaviors have
Figure 3. Dopamine Neuron Responses in
an Information Choice Task
(A) On each trial after achieving central fixation
monkeys viewed a target prefacing an informative
(green) or uninformative (orange) cue. Single target
trials (top and bottom) were interleaved with two-
target trials where monkeys were free to select the
target they wished to view. If monkeys shifted
gaze to the informative target (green) they were
shown two subsequent cues that were consis-
tently associated with, respectively, a large or
small water reward. If monkeys shifted gaze to the
uninformative target (orange) theywere shown two
other cues that were inconsistently associated
with the large or small reward (50% predictive
validity). The large and small reward were equally
likely to occur, so that the informative and unin-
formative targets had equal expected reward.
(B) Neural responses of DA cells on the information
choice task The traces show average activity in
a population of DA cells, aligned on the time of
target presentation, appearance of the reward
cues and delivery of the final reward. At the time
of target presentation the neurons had stronger
responses when the display contained an infor-
mative target (dark and light red traces) than when
it only contained the uninformative target (blue).
After the information was revealed (cue) DA
neurons had the expected reward prediction
response. At the time of cue presentation they had
excitatory and inhibitory responses to, respec-
tively, the high and low reward predictive pattern,
and small excitatory responses to the uncertain
pattern announcing a 50% probability of reward.
At the time of the reward, the neurons had excit-
atory and inhibitory responses upon receipt of,
respectively, the large and small reward, but only if
this rewardwas unpredicted (i.e., upon selection of
the uninformative cue). Reproduced with permis-
sion from (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009).
Neuron
Perspectiveadopted a more pragmatic approach and attempt to estimate
the material value that an eye movement may bring (Hayhoe
and Ballard, 2005; Tatler et al., 2011). The studies make use of
so-called Markov decision chains—mathematical methods that
allow one to formulate a task description as a sequence of steps
and estimate the cumulative future reward that can be expected
by traversing these steps. By including an estimate of the uncer-
tainty that arises at each step, one can further calculate the costs
of this uncertainty and the benefits of reducing it by obtaining
information (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Rothkopf and Ballard,
2010; Sprague and Ballard, 2005; Tatler et al., 2011). For
instance, in the tea-making task, one can calculate howuncertain
one is about one’s position and distance from the faucet, and
what the benefit would be of reducing that uncertainty through
a shift of gaze. These studies have shown how, when applied
to complex tasks (such as an agent walking through an environ-
ment while avoiding obstacles and picking up litter) these
methods can be applied to identify the uncertainty and informa-
tional requirements of intermediate steps (Rothkopf and Ballard,
2010; Sprague and Ballard, 2005).
However, even as they demonstrate the feasibility of this
computation, the studies show that information selection can
be remarkably complex. Most of the complexity derives from
the fact that, because the benefits of information are only indi-
rect, computing its value requires planning across a sequenceof steps. Moreover, this planning requires not only a simple
knowledge of the order of various steps, but a sophisticated
model of the task structure that specifies the hidden (causal)
relationships between consecutive steps. Consider for example
the simple act of directing gaze to the water faucet while
preparing a tea (Figure 2A). To generate this apparently trivial
act, the brain must know not only that the faucet is associated
with the task (after all, so are the kitchen floor and the walls)
but that lifting the handle will cause the water to flow, which in
turn will have a determining influence on preparing the tea. In
other words, to determine which sources of uncertainty should
be optimally resolved, the brain must know which steps are
causal or predictive of the future outcome (Gershman and Niv,
2010). In a simple scenario such as making a tea this computa-
tion may be greatly aided by extensive practice. In other behav-
iors, however, it requires much more difficult inferences on
longer time scales. It can be prohibitively complex for example,
to determine which one of the available stimuli is informative if
one lands on Mars, or which economic indicator is truly conse-
quential for a future outlook.
Converging evidence shows that humans indeed infer hidden
models of complex tasks (Acun˜a and Schrater, 2010; Braun
et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; Gershman and Niv, 2010; Yakush-
ijin and Jacobs, 2011), and indirect evidence from tasks involv-
ing schemas or contextual associations suggests that lowerNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 287
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2006; Braun et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2012). Building internal
models that identify the relevant steps is critical for specifying
what subset of a very high-dimensional information stream
should be considered at a given time. Such models, in other
worlds, are necessary for deciding to what to attend. As
mentioned above in relation with the associability equation
(Equation 2), this process entails an executive mechanism that
learns how to learn—that is, decides how to organize the
moment by moment sampling of sensory information. The
need for hierarchical learning has been discussed in relation to
motor control and cognitive tasks (Braun et al., 2010; Johnson
et al., 2012) and, as it is clear from this discussion, is also at
the heart of attention control.
Given an appropriate model of a task structure, informative
options (stimuli or actions) may be identified through a prediction
error mechanism as those options which, by reducing uncer-
tainty, increase the expected future reward. Importantly,
however, the reward prediction errors that have been tradition-
ally considered in dopamine cells are model-free quantities
that only register changes in value between consecutive time
steps (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). Such a mechanism can be
prohibitively slow in complex tasks, and may erroneously assign
credit to irrelevant steps (Rothkopf et al., 2007). A model free
system for example may conclude that the decision to wear
a white shirt was critical for obtaining a high grade on a test,
simply because this decision was closer in time to the actual
exam relative to the earlier act of studying for the exam. Recent
evidence from functional imaging experiments in humans
suggests that dopamine cells and their recipient structures
also encode model-based prediction errors that take into
account future actions (Daw et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2006; Ta-
kahashi et al., 2011) suggesting a potential involvement in
model-based mechanisms. As I discuss in the final section, the
distinction between model-free and model-based computations
is fundamental and may explain key differences between an
‘‘attention for action’’ and ‘‘attention for liking’’ mechanism.
Executive Control and Target Selection
Although the neural mechanisms computing relevance are very
poorly understood, lesion studies in monkeys and rats suggest
that they depend on the frontal lobes. The studies implicate the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and
the orbital frontal cortex in this computation (sometimes referred
to as a ‘‘credit assignment’’ computation) (Kolling et al., 2012;
Rossi et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2011)
and suggest that these areas may convey the results to dopa-
minergic cells (Takahashi et al., 2011). Interestingly, converging
evidence suggests that the parietal target selection response,
which reflects the moment by moment deployment of attention,
has a number of complex properties that may reflect an interface
with executive mechanisms (Gottlieb and Snyder, 2010).
A good illustration of these complex properties comes from an
experiment that I mentioned above, where we trained monkeys
to report the orientation of a visual target by releasing a bar
(Oristaglio et al., 2006). The task required monkeys to find a rele-
vant target using covert attention as described above (Figure 4A)
and in addition to apply a learnt stimulus-action association
namely, to release a bar held in their right paw if the instructive288 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.cue was oriented to the right (an ‘‘E’’) or a bar held in the left
paw if it was oriented to the left (a ‘‘3’’). The task therefore did
not require monkeys to orient to the attended location but
rather report the information at that location using an arbitrary
(symbolic) action, much as one would step on the brake when
seeing a red traffic light or step on the gas when seeing a green
light.
As I mentioned in the previous section, parietal neurons en-
coded the location of the relevant cue, and some of the cells
had only a target selection response, responding more if the
cue rather than a distractor was in the RF regardless of the
manual release (Figure 4B). These simple spatial responses are
consistent with the traditional view of attention control, whereby
the top-down drive contains only spatial and not non-spatial
information (e.g., Figure 1B). A sizeable fraction of cells however
showed a combinatorial coding of both the attended location
and the bar release. Some of the cells, like that shown in Fig-
ure 4C, responded selectively if the ‘‘E’’ was in their receptive
field and instructed release of the left bar; other cells had
the complementary preference, responding best if the ‘‘E’’ was
in their receptive field and instructed release of the left bar
(not shown). These manual modulations were not free-standing
limb motor responses but modulatory effects on visual selection
(i.e., the effects were not seen if a distractor appeared in the
receptive field; Figure 4C, right), a conclusion consistent with
the later finding that reversible inactivation produced visual but
not skeletal motor defects (Balan and Gottlieb, 2009).
These findings are difficult to explain in a purely visual frame-
work that casts target selection as a disembodied bias term (Fig-
ure 1B). They are also puzzling in an action based framework that
asks whether parietal areas are involved in skeletal or ocular
actions (Snyder et al., 2000). However, neural responses with
combinatorial (mixed) properties are hallmarks of goal-directed
cognitive control (Rigotti et al., 2010), and in the context of
information selection may embody the bank of knowledge that
is necessary for selecting cues. These results therefore raise
the important question of how target selection interfaces with
frontal processes of executive control and with visual learn-
ing mechanisms that assign meaning to visual cues (Albright,
2012; Freedman and Assad, 2011; Mirabella et al., 2007). One
important question is what these complex responses imply for
the nature of top-down control. Is the attentional feedback
from the parietal lobe only carried by neurons with simple spatial
responses, consistent with current assumptions that it only
carries spatial information (e.g., Figure 1B)? Or, alternatively,
does the top-down feedback carry higher bandwidth information
regarding both stimuli and actions, conveyed by neurons with
combined responses (Baluch and Itti, 2011)? A second question
concerns the sophistication of the information conveyed by this
combinatorial code: does this code reflect only coincidental
associations between stimuli and contexts or actions, or do
they reflect internal models of multielement tasks?
In sum, the preceding discussion has highlighted some of the
complexities that can be entailed by a shift of gaze. Far from
requiring a mere direct or habitual sensorimotor link, computing
an effective scan path for sampling information requires an exec-
utive mechanism that infers the relevant steps in an extend
task, and uses this inference to determine points of significant
Figure 4. Lateral Intraparietal Neurons Combine Responses to Visual Selection and Visuomanual Associations
(A) Search task. An array of several figure-8 placeholders remained stable on the screen at all times. To begin a trial monkeys directed their eye to the central
fixation point (dot) and grabbed two response bars. The search display was then revealed, and contained a cue (a right or left-facing letter ‘‘E’’) that appeared at an
unpredictable location in among letter-like distractors. Monkeys were trained to continue holding central fixation and release a bar held in the right or left hand to
indicate whether the ‘‘E’’ was facing, respectively, to the right or to the left.
(B) A parietal neuron that was sensitive only to cue location. The panels show the activity of a lateral intraparietal neuron aligned on the time of target onset. In each
row of action potential, the time of the manual release marked by a black dot. Left and right panels are sorted according to the location of the ‘‘E.’’ Blue and red
traces refer to trials in which the ‘‘E’’ required release of, respectively, the left or right bar.
(C) A neuron sensitive to both cue location and manual release The neuron encoded ‘‘E’’ location but was modulated by the manual release, responding more
strongly if the monkey released the left rather than the right bar. Reproduced with permission from (Oristaglio et al., 2006).
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uncertainty.
Attending to the Unknown
While the preceding discussion has focused on target selection
in familiar tasks, an equally important and possibly more difficult
role of attention is to discover new information – learn about new
predictors that were previously unknown. We almost instinc-
tively orient to a new sign in a store front or to a strange bird
perched on a tree, and in laboratory tasks, gaze is drawn to
novel or uncertain stimuli in familiar scenes (Brockmole and
Henderson, 2005a, 2005b; Yang et al., 2009). As described
in Figure 2B, studies of associative learning propose that
exploratory attention is mediated by a separate system of
‘‘attention for learning’’ which, in contrast with ‘‘attention for
action,’’ allocates resources to uncertain rather than reliable
cues (Figure 2B, center panel). Model-based accounts however,
suggest that this distinction may not be quite as clear cut, and
that, even when the brain orients toward uncertain cues, it is
with the goal of learning or reducing the uncertainty regarding
that cue.
It has been previously noted that to generate adaptive explo-
ration the brain must distinguish between at least two types of
uncertainty (Oudeyer et al., 2007; Payzan-LeNestour and Bos-
saerts, 2011; Yu and Dayan, 2005). Reducible uncertainty is
due to the observer’s imperfect knowledge and can be elimi-
nated by acquiring information—for example when we hear anambulance siren and turn to find out where it is. Irreducible
uncertainty by contrast is built into a task and cannot be reduced
through the observers’ effort—as in the case of white noise on a
television screen. If ‘‘attention for learning’’ is specifically guided
by reducible uncertainty (as it would optimally be) its goal need
not be fundamentally different from that of an action-based
mechanism. Neither form of attention values uncertainty per se.
Instead, both may be information-seeking mechanisms that
detect the presence of uncertainty and devise strategies for
reducing that uncertainty (Dayan and Daw, 2008).
A difficult question however is how the brain distinguishes
between reducible and irreducible uncertainty, as this is not a
priori specified. When conducting scientific research, for
example, humans are faced with vast sources of uncertainty
which, despite significant effort, we are yet to resolve. What
determines whether we continue our search or conclude that
this is a fruitless task?
Several intriguing solutions have been proposed to this ques-
tion in the machine learning field. One solution, emerging from
the field of developmental robotics, is that the brain generates
intrinsic reward when it senses learning progress (i.e., a decline
in prediction errors over time) (Oudeyer et al., 2007). This mech-
anism may motivate learning even in the absence of an external
reward, and has been very effective in producing curiosity-like
behaviors—whereby robots remain spontaneously interested
in activities of intermediate complexity where they improve their
predictions but disengage from random (unlearnable) or fromNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 289
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goal directed exploration is not motivated by learning progress
but by reward expectations that are generalized based on prior
experience (P. Dayan, personal communication). For example,
when deciding which experiment to pursue we may infer based
on past knowledge that a particular approach will be more effec-
tive. Interestingly, this form of generalization may call upon the
same executive mechanisms of ‘‘learning to learn’’ that we dis-
cussed the previous section: to generalize effectively the brain
must recognize and compare the relevant (significant) aspects
of the different tasks (Bavelier et al., 2012).
In addition to processes that generate targeted information
search, exploratory mechanisms almost invariably include
simpler strategies, based on random action selection or hard-
wired heuristics. For instance, novelty has been proposed to
act as an exploration bonus in reward seeking tasks (Wittmann
et al., 2008) and to be encoded in dopamine cells as an intrinsic
bonus for exploration (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). This raises
the possibility that other forms of automatic attention that are
produced by salience or surprise (Boehnke et al., 2011; Karacan
andHayhoe, 2008;Wittmann et al., 2008), rather than beingmere
weaknesses of a control mechanism, are vital heuristics for allo-
cating resources in very uncertain conditions, when the brain has
not yet learnt how to learn.
Neuropsychological studies in rats suggest that task-related
and exploratory attention rely on separate neural circuits that
involve, respectively, the medial frontal cortex (Maddux and
Holland, 2011) versus the substantia nigra, amygdala and the
parietal lobe (Maddux et al., 2007). It would be of great interest
to know whether this distinction also holds in the monkey and
how it is expressed in individual cells—i.e., whether the frontal
eye field mediates a system of ‘‘attention for action’’ while the
parietal lobe is more closely related with an exploratory mecha-
nism. Neural responses to uncertainty or surprise have been
reported in multiple structures (den Ouden et al., 2010; Fiorillo
et al., 2003; Kepecs et al., 2008; McCoy and Platt, 2005; O’Neill
and Schultz, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008; Schultz et al.,
2008; So and Stuphorn, 2012; Tobler et al., 2009) and have
been linked with variables such as arousal, anxiety, risk prefer-
ence, or global learning rates (Nassar et al., 2012; Preuschoff
and Bossaerts, 2007). An important question is how these
responses are related with selective attention and with the
processes computing the uncertainty or information value of
specific cues.
Attention for Liking
The final system shown in Figure 2B is the system of ‘‘attention
for liking,’’ whereby subjects preferentially direct attention to
pleasurable or high reward cues. Although not guided by
reliability or expected information, this form of attention is a
powerful mechanism, which automatically draws resources to
stimuli that have intrinsic emotional or conditioned associations
(Damaraju et al., 2009; Flagel et al., 2011; Hickey et al., 2010a,
2010b; Hogarth et al., 2010; Della Libera and Chelazzi, 2009;
Vuilleumier, 2005). These attentional influences are difficult to
overcome andmay underlie maladaptive reactions in psychiatric
disorders, such as the enhanced susceptibility of addicted
patients to drug-related cues (Flagel et al., 2011).290 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.The neural substrates of emotional attention are not very well
understood, but a recent experiment in our laboratory suggests
that they include the parietal lobe. The experiment, illustrated in
Figure 5, tested how attention and parietal activity are influenced
by stimuli that convey positive or negative reward information
but do not instruct the monkey as to an appropriate action
(Peck et al., 2009).
Monkeys began each trial with a 50% prior probability of
reward and, at the onset of a trial were shown a reward cue—
a conditioned stimulus that signaled whether the current trial
will end in a reward (CS+) or a lack of reward (CS) (Figure 5A).
However, while the CS reliably signaled a 50% increase or
a decrease in expected reward relative to prior expectations,
they did not indicate the required action. To successfully
complete the trial and progress to the next, monkeys had to
make a saccade to an independent target that appeared
after the disappearance of the CS and was located randomly
either at the same or at the opposite location. An incorrect trial
(where monkeys did not look at the target) was immediately
repeated until correctly completed. This allowed us to distin-
guish between attentional orienting to the relevant target or
to the initial, reward-predicting CS. An attention system that
directs resources in goal-directed fashion would assign priority
to the target regardless of the CS; by contrast, a system of
‘‘attention for liking’’ may automatically orient based on the value
of the CS.
The behavioral and neural results revealed the influence of
both mechanisms. In most trials monkeys accurately directed
gaze to the target, showing that they had learnt its significance.
This learning however was not perfect, and saccades were also
biased by the preceding CS. The strongest effect was for
saccades following a low-reward cue (CS) (Figure 5D). If the
target happened to appear at the location that had been occu-
pied by a CS, the monkeys’ saccades had longer reaction
times and lower accuracy relative to saccades to other locations.
Notably, this interference was not due to lower motivation but
was spatially specific, showing that attention was inhibited
specifically at the CS location.
This behavioral bias in the monkeys’ saccades was correlated
with CS evoked responses in the parietal lobe (Figures 5B and
5C). After presentation of a CS+ or CS in their receptive field,
lateral intraparietal neurons had a transient visual response
that was higher for a positive relative to a negative cue, consis-
tently with previously reported reward modulations (Figure 5B,
blue versus red trace). Surprisingly, however—given that the
CS had no action relevance—the neurons maintained a sus-
tained response to the CS during the ensuing delay. Moreover,
as seen for the behavioral effect, this persistent response did
not reflect global changes in arousal or motivation, but a spatial
bias toward or away from the CS location. Sustained activity
following a CS+ was higher at the cue location relative to the
opposite location, suggesting that attention lingered at the
CS+ location (Figure 5C, top, black versus gray trace). By
contrast, sustained activity following a CS was lower at the
cue’s location relative to the opposite location (Figure 5C,
bottom), consistent with the behavioral suppression at the CS
location. The CS evoked inhibition interfered with themonkeys’
performance and lowered their rate of reward. Nevertheless, the
Figure 5. Pavlovian Attention in the Lateral Intraparietal Area
(A) Behavioral task. Each trial has a 50% prior probability of ending in a reward. After monkeys achieved central fixation a peripheral cue was flashed for 300 ms
either inside the neuron’s receptive field (dashed oval) or at the opposite location. Cues were abstract colored patterns that signaled with certainty whether the
trial will receive a reward (CS+) or no reward (CS). After a 600 ms delay period a second target appeared unpredictably at the same or opposite location relative
to the CS andmonkeys have tomake an immediate saccade to this target to receive the outcome announced by theCS. An error trial is immediately repeated until
correctly completed, so that monkeys have to perform each trial to progress in the task.
(B) Parietal responses to the reward cues. When a CS appeared in the receptive field the population of cells showed transient and sustained responses that were
selective for cue value, being stronger for a positive cue predicting a reward (CS+, blue) relative to a negative cue predicting no reward (CS, red). The stars show
time bins with a significant difference between the two conditions. The bottom dashed line shows the pre-cue level of activity. Shading shows the standard error
of the mean.
(C) CS-evoked responses were spatially specific. The dark traces in each panel show responses when the CS appeared in the receptive field and the gray traces,
responses when the CS appeared at the opposite location. (The dark traces are the same as, respectively, the blue and red traces in A, but are shown on an
expanded vertical axis.) Responses evoked by a receptive field cue are higher than (CS+) or lower than (CS) those at the opposite, non-stimulated location,
showing that they reflected a spatial bias, and not a global change in motivation.
(D) Saccadic effects of CS cues. Eyemovements in a representative session on unrewarded trials when the saccade target was spatially congruent with a CS.
The location of the CS and target is normalized as if falling horizontally on the right (coordinates of (1,0)) and each gray dot shows the endpoint of a single saccade.
The bottom panel shows saccades that followed highly familiar, overlearned CS (corresponding to the neural responses shown in B). The top panel shows
responses on trial with newly learned CS that were introduced and trained within a single session. Measurement of anticipatory licking showed that monkeys
learned the value of the novel CS within the first 5–10 trials, and data collection began after this learning was complete. Presentation of a CS impaired saccade
accuracy if the target happened to be congruent with the CS location, and the impairment was stronger for overlearned relative to newly learned CS.
(E) Overtraining produces plastic changes in the visual response Bottom-up responses to the trained CS were tested in a separate control condition where
the previously trained CS were flashed as task-irrelevant probes. In this condition a first predictive CS and the saccade target appeared opposite the receptive
field (top panel). Simultaneous with presentation of the saccade target a previously trained CS (the probe) was flashed briefly in the receptive field. The probes
had prior reward associations but did not predict reward on these trials. For an overtrained pattern, the bottom-up response remained selective to previous
reward associations (bottom left). This value dependent visual response produced differential interference with the saccade, as shown in the bottom right
panel. Saccade reaction times (RT) were longer in the presence of a positive relative to a negative probe (blue versus red), reflecting the stronger interference
by the positive pattern. Note that RT were longer on unrewarded relative to rewarded trials, showing that monkeys correctly inferred reward probability based
on the first predictive CS (that had appeared opposite the receptive field) and not based on the irrelevant probe. Modified with permission from Peck et al.
(2009).
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responses and behavior, were larger after familiar relative to
novel CS (Figure 5D, bottom versus top). Moreover, after pro-
longed training theeffects seemed to involveplasticity of theearly
visual response, since they became insensitive to context and
automatically transferred to a different task in which the pre-
trained CS no longer predicted reward (Figure 5E).These findings describe a correlate of ‘‘attention for liking’’
phenomena described in behavioral research, whereby attention
is automatically biased by the reward (conditioned) stimulus
associations. The findings are consistent with several—not
mutually exclusive—mechanisms. One possibility is that they
are related to the phenomenon of inhibition of return, whereby
attention is inhibited from revisiting recently examined locationsNeuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 291
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specific reinforcement mechanisms. The value-dependent ori-
enting described in Figure 5 may arise through a modulation of
visual activity by a dopamine reward prediction error response
(e.g., Figure 3B) which, like the responses in the parietal lobe,
is excitatory for a positive and inhibitory for a negative reward
predictive cue. This modulation may also differ from that under-
lying goal-directed control in that it acts in model-free rather than
model-based fashion. As I discussed in the previous section,
a model-based allocation would assign priority to the target in
the Peck et al. (2009) task, since this was the stimulus that was
informative for the future action. A model-free mechanism by
contrast would assign priority to the initial CS, since this was
the stimulus that signaled a change in reward expectations.
Regardless of the specific answers to these questions (which
remain to be determined by future research), the findings high-
light the critical point that rewardmay influence attention through
several distinct mechanisms. A goal-directed mechanism
assigns value to stimuli based on their relevance to future
actions, while an agnostic system simply prioritizes stimuli that
signal changes in reward expectation.
Why would the brain possess an automatic ‘‘attention for
liking’’ mechanism, if this can produce maladaptive effects?
This question, which arises here in the context of emotional
attention, can be equally applied to other forms of automatic
orienting such as those based on salience, novelty or surprise,
which can also interfere with ongoing tasks. The answer to this
question is not fully known, but an important consideration
may be the difficulty of an optimal (model-based) computation.
As we have seen in the preceding sections, computing informa-
tion value optimally is a costly and time-consuming operation
that requires inference and advance planning for multiple future
steps, and can itself be suboptimal in complex tasks (Wilson and
Niv, 2011). Automatic forms of attention by contrast are based on
much simpler heuristics. Therefore, the brain may have retained
these systems as vital and useful tools for rapidly allocating
resources to potentially significant information.
Conclusion: Who Needs Attention?
While all living organisms take actions that bring biological
reward, a unique hallmark of higher intelligence is a vast capacity
for learning and prediction (Friston, 2010). Here, I proposed that
selective attention is intimately linked with these prediction
mechanisms. I have argued that attention is the core cognitive
system thatmediates our active search for information—whether
information is sought for a foreseeable, well-practiced action or
in a more open-ended, exploratory fashion.
While this view is consistent with reinforcement learning
research, it is not well integrated with studies of oculomotor
control. A closer integration would be beneficial on several
counts. First, as I described in the earlier sections, this integra-
tion has become necessary for understanding core open ques-
tions in attention control—i.e., how the brain decides when and
to what to attend. To understand this question—as well as
complex properties of the target selection response—we will
need to understand the visual learning mechanisms by which
the brain assigns meaning to visual cues, and the cognitive
systems that assign value to these cues.292 Neuron 76, October 18, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Second, by appreciating the cognitive dimension of eyemove-
ment control we can begin use the full power of this system as
a window into cognitive function. As mentioned in the opening
sections, existing research has used the oculomotor system to
study cognitive variables involved in decision formation but
have interpreted the results in a highly simplified framework of
sensorimotor transformation. For example in a well-known
motion discrimination paradigm, the direction of motion of
a sensory cue is thought to be discriminated by cells in the
middle temporal area, while lateral intraparietal cells select the
appropriate action (e.g., a specific saccade) (Gold and Shadlen,
2007). This framework therefore explains oculomotor decisions
as a sensory-to-motor transfer without invoking the concept of
selective attention.
The need for selective attention, however, becomes clear
whenwe consider that, in addition to analyzing visual information
the brain must solve another highly complex task—namely,
determine the significance and value of that information. As I
have discussed above, this requires the brain to estimate its
uncertainty and the ability of sensory cues to reduce that uncer-
tainty. The processes involved in this selection include building
internal models of external events, guiding behavior based on
curiosity and exploration, and generating (and controlling)
emotional biases in information processing. Some of these
processes have been studied in behavioral paradigms and, by
recognizing their tight links with selective attention we can use
the oculomotor system to gain insight into their cellular
substrates.
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